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Abstract
We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association
that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the
association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formu-
lation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we
perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents
are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a
two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide
conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits
increases membership in both periods.
JEL classification numbers: C73, D71.
Key words: Public Goods, Associations, Dynamic Global Games, Heterogeneous Com-
munities
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1 Introduction
We study the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that provides a
public good and incentives excludable to non-members. The literature on private provi-
sion of public goods focuses mainly on the free rider problem that arises from strategic
substitutability of one agent’s contribution with other agents’ contributions.1 In “The
Logic of Collective Action”, Olson [16] suggests that membership in large associations
can be explained, despite the extreme free rider problem, if the group is able to provide
incentives excludable to non-members. These selective incentives can give a direct utility,
like a magazine, or acquire value through social interaction, as in the case of reputation
or peer pressure. In both cases, it is reasonable to assume that incentives display strate-
gic complementarities: the more people join the group, the higher the value of being a
member. This assumption generates a multiplicity of equilibria: nobody joins, everybody
joins, and some intermediate case that is generically unstable. They all are unsuitable
for comparative statics analysis.
Carlsson and Van Damme [2] and Morris and Shin [13] show how the introduction of
noisy signals in games with strategic complementarities can generate a unique equilib-
rium.2 Introducing a similar payoff uncertainty into our membership game, we show that
∗We would like to thank Andrew Postlewaite, Steven Matthews, Stephen Morris, George Mailath,
Antonio Merlo, Julio Davila, Francis Bloch and Celso Brunetti. All usual disclaimers apply.
1One example among many is Mailath and Postlewaite [11].
2“Multiplicity of equilibria arise largely as the unintended consequence of two modelling assumptions
- the fundamentals are assumed to be common knowledge, and economic agents know others’ actions in
equilibrium. Both are questionable.” Morris and Shin [13] .
in the unique equilibrium a positive measure of people joins and we show existence of a
fee that maximizes the expected size of the group. We analyze the effects on membership
decisions of increasing uncertainty about the group’s ability to provide the public good,
and of threats to the status quo provision level of the public good. Our results are consis-
tent with empirical observations on large citizen groups that have attracted considerable
attention in the political science literature.
We explore the effect of heterogeneity among prospective members on the equilibrium
group size. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium when agents differ in their
willingness to pay for selective incentives, and we show that, under certain conditions,
increasing heterogeneity while keeping the mean willingness to pay constant decreases
the equilibrium size of the group.
Finally, we analyze a dynamic version of the model. A membership decision is not
once and for all: typically agents are invited to join or renew their memberships every so
often. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that after periods of learning and adjustment
new opportunities (office positions, familiarity with the internal mechanism) are avail-
able within the group to returning members. This endogenously generates heterogeneity
between “senior” and “junior” members. We provide sufficient conditions for existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium and show that the existence of seniority benefits increases
membership not only in the second period, but also in the first. Seniority benefits directly
increase the value of joining immediately, but they also increase the payoff of waiting and
joining in the future because of strategic complementarities. Hence, showing uniqueness
of equilibrium is an interesting problem also from a theoretical perspective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some examples
of successful collective action, describes the typical membership contract and reviews the
literature. The basic structure of the static model, the characterization of the equilibrium
and the comparative statics results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 relaxes the
assumption of homogeneity of agents. Section 5 contains the dynamic setting and section
6 concludes. Most of the proofs are in the Appendix.
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2 Large Citizen Associations
The National Association Study shows that the mean and median membership size of US
associations are, respectively, 27,575 and 750.3 These numbers suggest that, although
not many, very large associations exist. Examples we have in mind are environmentalist
groups like NWF (4 million of members), WWF (1,000,000), Sierra Club (700,000) or
professional groups like AEA (23,000).4 Another example is represented by trade unions.
All these groups provide some benefits for their members in exchange for a fee, and have
been successful in producing a public good.
The political science literature has extensively analyzed the composition of selective
incentives that citizen associations offer. The benefits provided by groups have been
divided into material, solidary and purposive. The typical purposive benefit is the satis-
faction derived from the actual contribution to a cause deemed worthy by the member.
A solidary benefit derives from the opportunity of social interaction among members
provided by the group. Material benefits include publications, discounts, T-shirts, etc.
The existing literature on warm-glow has already analyzed the role of purposive in-
centives in contribution games.5 We focus on a material incentive like a publication for
two reasons. First, a survey in Walker [18] on interests group in America shows that
virtually every group in his sample of 206 citizen associations offers some kind of publi-
cation which is considered one of the most important benefit by members. Second, the
role of solidary benefits seems modest, since, as reported in Putnam [17], 87 percent of
Sierra Club members never attended a single group meeting.
One common criticism to the argument that successful collective action is due only to
private benefits is that a competing firm not burdened by the cost of producing the public
good can offer just the private benefit at a lower price. We believe that in the case of
publications establishing a brand name through success in providing the public good gives
the association some monopoly power over the private good. Moreover the production
technology may display economies of scale. Discounts on postal rates, preferred tax
3As reported in Knoke [10].
4Data from the individual websites of each association as of 2003.
5See Andreoni [1].
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treatments or free interns are other instances in which the provision of a public good
gives a cost advantage in the production of the selective benefits.
We can think also to alternative reasons why the utility of membership may be in-
creasing with the success of the group in providing the public good. For example, if
an environmentalist group is expected to be successful in influencing the laws on car
emissions, a reader would find the point of view expressed in the group newspaper to be
a valuable piece of information when buying a new car. Success in accomplishing some
environmental protection project may well enhance the quality of hiking and animal
watching activities of members.6
We model the selective incentives provided by associations as a particular form of
club good: excludable to non-members, non-rival and with negligible costs of congestion.
This assumption captures a fundamental characteristic of the incentives packages we see
in reality and uncovers the coordination problem agents face, since their payoff of joining
displays strategic complementarities.
Two strands of literature are related to our work. The first deals with impure public
goods, and the second with dynamic global games.
Cornes and Sandler [3, 4, 5] are the first to introduce an impure public good model
in which the purchase of any quantity of an intermediate good makes available, through
a joint production function, fixed proportions of public good and private characteristic.
With sufficiently strong complementarities between the private characteristic and the
public good, individual demand for the intermediate good may be increasing in the
quantity demanded by others, thus alleviating the free rider problem. They do not
address directly the issue of coordination among agents. Morgan [12] applies the impure
public good approach to model public good provision and shows the existence of a unique
equilibrium when the public good is funded through a lottery.
As for dynamic applications of global games, the two closest papers are Dasgupta
[6] and Heidhues and Melissas [8]. Heidhues and Melissas [8] focus on cohort effects,
while Dasgupta [6] focuses on social learning. In both papers, contrary to our paper, the
6See King and Walker [9].
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decision to contribute is once and for all, and the interaction between learning by doing
effect and strategic complementarities is absent.
3 The Model
There is a continuum of homogeneous agents of size 1. They decide independently and
simultaneously whether or not to join a group. Let k > 0 be the cost of membership
and e ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of agents joining the group. The group’s total revenues
ke are used as an input in a binary production function. This function generates a pure
public good and a non-rival club good that agents enjoy only if they are members. We
use this assumption as a convenient way to model the observation that selective benefits
are often tied to the success in providing the public good.
The production function is:
y(e) =
 0 if ke < θy¯ if ke > θ ,
where y¯ > 0 and θ is a stochastic threshold.7
The common utility function is:
 U (λy (e) , (1− λ) y (e))− k if the agent joins the groupU (0, (1− λ) y(e)) if she does not join the group,
where the exogenous parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) represents the extent by which y(e) can be
excluded and jointly consumed only by members. U (·, ·) is increasing in both arguments
and U (0, 0) = 0. To simplify notation let the difference in the utility of joining and not
joining, in case of success of the group be:
n = U (λy¯, (1− λ) y¯)− U (0, (1− λ) y¯)
The net utility from joining is:
Pr {ke ≥ θ} · n− k.
7An example of a similar stochastic binary production function can be found in Nitzan and Romano
[15].
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To rule out the uninteresting case in which joining is dominated we assume that:
n > k.
Consider first the perfect information case. Let θ = θ > 0 be known and such that
ke = θ for some e ∈ [0, 1] , so that it is possible to produce the public good if enough
agents join. The simultaneous move game always has two pure strategy equilibria: one
in which nobody joins and one with everybody joins.
Assume now that the true level of the threshold is a random draw from a prior
distribution that is normal with mean µ and variance σ2, with µ ∈ (0, k). The equilibrium
outcomes are e = {0, 1}, and
e =
Φ−1
(
k
n
)√
σ + µ
k
,
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution.8 This additional outcome derives
from a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium that is not stable. Note that all previous
equilibria are not responsive to fundamentals, or unstable.
We now introduce asymmetric information. Each agent receives a signal θi of the true
state θ. θ is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ and
θi = θ +
√
τεi,
where εi ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d. across agents and τ > 0.9
Define the interim expected net payoff of membership for an agent with signal θi for
given proportion of members e:
pi(θi, e) = Pr {ke ≥ θ|θi}n− k.
Note that there exist θ and θ such that if θi < θ, then pi(θi, e) > 0 for all e; and if θi > θ,
then pi(θi, e) < 0 for all e. This means that there exist regions of the space of signals
where agents have a dominant strategy. Moreover, agent i, conditional on her signal,
puts strictly positive probability on the events θj < θ and θj > θ for each j.
8For e = 1 to be an equilibrium outcome we need kn ∈
(
Φ
(
−µ√
σ
)
,Φ
(
k−µ√
σ
))
.
9The normality assumption of θ allows us to derive closed form solutions. The uniqueness result of
Theorem 1 would go through also assuming any prior probability distribution that satisfies the conditions
in Morris and Shin [14].
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Theorem 1 There exists τ¯ > 0 such that, for τ ∈ (0, τ¯), there is a unique equilibrium
in which players follow a switching strategy around θn i.e. they join the group if θi < θn
and stay out otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix.
The result stated in Theorem 1 follows Morris and Shin [13, 14]. The proof has two
parts. First we prove that there exist a unique switching strategy equilibrium. Then
we show that a switching strategy is the only that survives iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies. θi < θ and θi > θ define upper and lower dominance regions
where each agent has a strictly dominant action. Starting from below (above), we can
iteratively delete a sequence of strictly dominated strategies between the two regions
since the expected payoff function is strictly increasing in the signal and displays strategic
complementarities. When τ is sufficiently small the iterated deletion process converges
to a unique point. In the limit:
lim
τ→0
θn = k
(
1− k
n
)
.
Note that, since the expected size of the group is
S = Φ
(
θn − µ√
σ + τ
)
,
S is maximized at k = n
2
.
3.1 Comparative Statics
“... people create and join organization in response to disturbances in the social environ-
ment,” Hansen [7].
“... when persons face a threat to their livelihood or to rights they already enjoy, they
are more likely to engage in collective action to protect these gains despite the problems
posed by the public goods dilemma,” Walker [19].
Walker [18] also underlines the attempts to frustrate antagonist associations by politi-
cians through different means like challenges to their not-for-profit status or raising postal
rates.
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One possible way of analyzing the effect of disturbances in the social environment
is to increase uncertainty in the ability of the association to provide the public good.
By looking at the effect of the precision of the public component of the signal on θn we
obtain:
Proposition 1 There exists τˆ > 0 such that, for τ ∈ (0, τˆ), the effect of an increase in
σ increases the equilibrium size of the group if and only if µ > k
(
1− k
n
)
.
Proof. The comparative statics of the size of the group S defined above with respect
to σ is:
dS
dσ
=φ
(
θn − µ√
σ + τ
) dθn
dσ
√
σ + τ + 1
2
√
σ+τ
(µ− θn)
σ + τ
,
where φ (·) is the standard normal density function and
dθn
dσ
=
dθ∗
dσ
(
1 +
√
τ
1
kφ
(
Φ−1
(
θ∗
k
)))
dθ∗
dσ
=
Φ−1
(
θ∗
k
)
+ 1
2
√
σ(σ+τ)
(2σ + τ) Φ−1
(
k
n
)
√
τ − σ 1
kφ(Φ−1( θ∗k ))
.
Note that
lim
τ→0
θ∗ = k
(
1− k
n
)
which implies that
lim
τ→0
dθn
dσ
= lim
τ→0
dθ∗
dσ
= 0.
Since
φ
(
θn − µ√
σ + τ
)
> 0,
when τ is small, the sign of dS
dσ
is the same of µ− k (1− k
n
)
.
Intuitively, an increase in the variance of θ shifts probability mass away from the
mean. When µ > k
(
1− k
n
)
, people choose not to join if they receive a signal close to
the mean. Therefore increasing the dispersion of the signal increases the probability of
receiving a signal lower than the equilibrium cut-off.
A raise in postal rates can be thought as an additional expense for the group and
has the same effect of a tax on collected membership fees. If the tax is α ∈ (0, 1), the
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equilibrium is defined by the system
θn = θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
(1− α) k
)
Φ
√τ (θ∗ − µ)√
σ (σ + τ)
−
√
σΦ−1
(
θ∗
(1−α)k
)
√
σ + τ
 = k
n
.
The limit cutoff value is
lim
τ→0
θn = (1− α) k
(
1− k
n
)
,
and with similar calculations as above
lim
τ→0
dθn
dα
= −k
(
1− k
n
)
< 0.
Hence, an increase in postal rate decreases membership.
To analyze the effect of threats to the public good, let x > 0 be the status quo level
of provision of the public good without collective action. In this case:
n = U (λy¯, x+ (1− λ) y¯)− U (0, x+ (1− λ) y¯) .
Note that dn
dx
< 0 if the cross derivative U12 (·, ·) is negative, and the size of the
group increases with a reduction of the status quo level of public good provision. The
assumption of U12 (·, ·) < 0 means that the utility of the selective benefit is decreasing
in the status quo level of public good provision. It does not conflict with the existence
of strategic complementarities, and can be justified if we consider selective benefits like
advocacy or representation before government.
4 Heterogeneous Agents
In this section we explore the consequences of heterogeneity in the population. Let an
exogenously given fraction p of the population have utility function Un (·, ·), and the
remaining (1− p) have utility function U s (·, ·) . Let: Un (λy¯, (1− λ) y¯)− Un (0, (1− λ) y¯) = nU s (λy¯, (1− λ) y¯)− U s (0, (1− λ) y¯) = s
9
and we assume s > n. Our simple form of heterogeneity describes a situation in which
there exists an exogenous proportion of agents who receive more value from the selective
benefit given the same level of public good.10 A sufficient condition on the utility functions
is Un1 (·, ·) < U s1 (·, ·). The information structure is the same as in section 3. In addition,
for simplicity, we set σ = 1.
We first prove existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in switching strategies along
the lines of Theorem 1. This will allow us to explore the effect of increasing heterogeneity
in the population on the equilibrium probability of providing the public good, and hence
on the equilibrium size of the group.
Theorem 2 There exist a τ¯ > 0 such that, for τ ∈ (0, τ¯), there is a unique equilibrium
in which players of type t = {n, s} follow a switching strategy around θt.
The proof, along the lines of Theorem 1, is in the Appendix.
We now investigate the equilibrium effect of increasing heterogeneity among agents.
We increase the net payoff of 1− p agents by ∆, decreasing it for the remaining p agents
by 1−p
p
∆. This spread holds constant the population mean net payoff.
Proposition 2 There exist a τ¯ ′ > 0 such that, for τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ′), increased heterogeneity in
the form of a mean preserving spread in net payoffs decreases the equilibrium size of the
group.
We leave the proof to the Appendix and outline the argument here. The probability
of success required by the indifferent type with benefit n is k
n
. When n decreases this
probability must increase of a factor k
n2
. The probability of success required by the
indifferent agent with benefit s decreases only by k
s2
. Since the probability of success is a
weighted average of the proportion of agents joining, the decrease of type n cutoff more
than compensates the increase in type s cutoff. The overall probability of success will
10An alternative way to introduce heterogeneity is consider a different membership fee. Given our
production function this assumption has an ambiguos effect on the expected payoff of joining since some
agents pay less but the positive externality on others is reduced. If the heterogeneity is in the utility
cost of the fee then the result is unchanged.
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decrease and the equilibrium size of the group will decrease as well. If we allow the group
to charge different fees to different types of agents in order to maximize the probability of
providing the public good, then heterogeneity in the form of a mean preserving spread is
of no consequence. More generally, note that the limiting size of the group, as τ converges
to zero, is an increasing and concave function of the distribution of valuations. Hence,
if two distributions of benefits F and G are such that F second-order stochastically
dominates G, then the equilibrium size of the group under F will be larger. Having the
same mean and smaller variance is not sufficient: indeed, if F and G have the same
mean, F has smaller variance than G, but G second-order stochastically dominates F,
the equilibrium size of the group will be larger under G.11
5 The Dynamic Model
In this section we analyze a two-period extension of the model to study the effect of
seniority benefits. After a period of learning and adjustment new opportunities (office
positions, familiarity with the internal mechanism, etc.) are available within the group.
In the first period agents consider not only the one shot gains from joining but also the
net expected difference in second period utility between joining as new members or in a
“senior” status.
If the signal of the first period contains valuable information about the second period
state, the proportion of agents that joined in the first period is an additional piece of
information upon which drawing inference on the new state. This information contagion
has been investigated in a number of different papers12; here we are more interested in
the “learning by doing” effect, and for simplicity we consider the new state independently
drawn.
In the first period agents are homogeneous: they all get the same payoff from joining
when the group is successful. In the second period a new state γ is drawn, agents receive
a noisy signal of the true state but now those agents that joined in the first period have
11An example is available upon request.
12See for example Dasgupta [6].
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higher utility if they decide to pay the membership fee and maintain their status for an
additional period.
The introduction of seniority benefits increases directly the continuation value of join-
ing in the first period but increases also the payoff of staying out because of strategic
complementarities. In addition monotonicity of payoffs in the signal is not apparent,
hence, showing uniqueness of an equilibrium is an interesting problem also from a the-
oretical perspective. The main result of this section is Proposition 3, which provides
conditions for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Let θi = θ +
√
τεi, γi = γ +
√
τηi be the signals in the first and second period
respectively, where
θ ∼ N (µ, 1)
γ ∼ N (µ, 1)
εi ∼ N (0, 1)
ηi ∼ N (0, 1) ,
all independent, and µ ∈ (0, k).
An agent decides in the first period whether to join or not after having seen her signal
and considering the continuation equilibrium of the second period. Different first period
signals will determine the expected proportion of senior agents in the second period given
the realized first period true state and the equilibrium strategy.
Using well-known properties of the normal distribution we have that:
θj|θ ∼ N (θ, τ)
θ|θi ∼ N
(
µτ + θi
1 + τ
,
τ
1 + τ
)
γj|γ ∼ N (γ, τ)
γ|γi ∼ N
(
µτ + γi
1 + τ
,
τ
1 + τ
)
.
We first solve for the equilibrium in the second period for a given proportion 1− p of
agents joining in the first period.
12
Denote by n the utility of an agent who joins the group for the first time when the
group is successful. In the second period, senior members get s > n, while new members
still receive n.
Conditional on the true state γ, if 1− p (p) agents follow a switching strategy around
γs (γn), the proportion of agents joining in the second period is:
pΦ
(
γn − γ√
τ
)
+ (1− p) Φ
(
γs − γ√
τ
)
.
The critical value γ∗ below which the group is successful is implicitly defined by:
k
(
pΦ
(
γn − γ∗√
τ
)
+ (1− p) Φ
(
γs − γ∗√
τ
))
= γ∗.
Conditional on γi, the expected payoff of type 1− p and p agents is respectively:
Pr (γ ≤ γ∗|γi) · s− k = Φ
(
γ∗ − γi + τ (γ∗ − µ)√
τ (1 + τ)
)
s− k
Pr (γ ≤ γ∗|γi) · n− k = Φ
(
γ∗ − γi + τ (γ∗ − µ)√
τ (1 + τ)
)
n− k.
When γi = γs (γn), 1 − p (p) agents should be indifferent between joining or not. In
equilibrium the following system has to be satisfied:
pΦ
(
γn−γ∗√
τ
)
+ (1− p) Φ
(
γs−γ∗√
τ
)
= γ
∗
k
Φ
(
γ∗−γs+τ(γ∗−µ)√
τ(1+τ)
)
= k
s
Φ
(
γ∗−γn+τ(γ∗−µ)√
τ(1+τ)
)
= k
n
.
(1)
We know from Section 4 that this system, for any p ∈ (0, 1), admits a unique solution
(γs, γn, γ
∗) for τ small, with γs > γn.
Let Φx|y be the cumulative normal distribution of x given y with corresponding density
φx|y and define gn (γi, p) = Φγ|γi
{
k
[
(1− p) Φγj |γ (γs) + pΦγj |γ (γn)
]}
n− k
gs (γi, p) = Φγ|γi
{
k
[
(1− p) Φγj |γ (γs) + pΦγj |γ (γn)
]}
s− k
(2)
to be the expected gains from joining in the second period for new (n) and senior (s)
members that receive signal γi. These expressions are function of the second period
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signals, given proportion p of agents who did not join in the first period and second
period equilibrium cutoffs (γn, γs).
If everybody follows a switching strategy around θn in the first period, the proportion
of agents that joins is (1− p) = Φθj |θ (θn), and we can redefine
gn (γi, p) = gn (γi, θ, θn)
gs (γi, p) = gs (γi, θ, θn) .
After some algebra, the net expected utility of membership conditional on θi when every-
body else follows a switching strategy around θn is:
pi (θi, θn) = Φθ|θi
[
kΦθj |θ (θn)
]
n− k+
+
∫ +∞
−∞
(∫ γs
−∞ gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)−
∫ γn
−∞ gn (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)
)
dΦθ|θi (θ) .
(3)
To show that a cutoff strategy can be an equilibrium and to use iterated deletion to prove
uniqueness of an equilibrium we need pi (θi, θn) to be monotone in θi.
First note that
Φθ|θi
[
kΦθj |θ (θn)
]
n− k
is decreasing in θi. To show that pi (θi, θn) is decreasing in θi we prove in the Appendix
that:
Claim 1 For τ small enough∫ +∞
−∞
(∫ γs
−∞
gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)−
∫ γn
−∞
gn (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)
)
dΦθ|θi (θ)
is decreasing in θi.
A higher signal in the first period reduces the expected probability of providing the
good, hence it reduces membership in the first period. In the second period there will
be less senior members, who have the greatest incentive to join, and the probability of
providing the public good will drop also in the second period. This reduces the payoff of
membership for both senior and new members. We show in the appendix that for small
τ , the effect on senior members dominates the one on junior members.
We can similarly show that pi (θi, θn) is increasing in θn. Now we are ready to state
the main result of this section.
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Proposition 3 There exist a τ˜ > 0 and b > 0 such that, for τ ∈ (0, τ˜) and (s− n) <
min {b, k}, there is a unique equilibrium in which players follow a switching strategy
around θn in the first period, and, in the second period, around γs if they joined in the
first period, and around γn otherwise.
From the previous discussion, we have shown that, for any strategy in the first period,
there exists a unique continuation equilibrium in the second period if τ ∈ (0, τ˜) . This
equilibrium is a switching strategy around γs (p) for players that joined in the first period,
and around γn (p) for players that did not. We have also shown that a switching strategy
in the first period can be an equilibrium. What is left to check is the existence of
dominance regions that allow us to start the iterated deletion process, and existence and
uniqueness of θ∗ that solves:
pi (θ∗, θ∗) = 0.
We start the argument with existence and uniqueness of a switching strategy equi-
librium. We can rewrite the last equation in two steps. Conditional on the true state θ,
if everybody follows a switching strategy around θn, the proportion of agents joining in
the first period is:
Φθj |θ (θn) = Φ
(
θn − θ√
τ
)
.
The critical value θ∗ below which the group is successful is implicitly defined by:
kΦ
(
θn − θ∗√
τ
)
= θ∗.
An agent should be indifferent between joining or not in the first period when she
receives a signal θi = θn. Using the definitions of gs (γi, θ, θn) and gn (γi, θ, θn) we obtain:
θn = θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
)
Φ
(√
τ(θ∗−µ)√
1+τ
− Φ
−1( θ
∗
k )√
1+τ
)
= k
n+Q(θ∗) ,
(4)
where Q (θ∗) is
∫ +∞
−∞
 ∫ γs−∞ gs (γi, θ, θ∗ +√τΦ−1 ( θ∗k )) dΦγi (γi)−
+
∫ γn
−∞ gn
(
γi, θ, θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
))
dΦγi (γi)
 dΦθ|θi=θ∗+√τΦ−1( θ∗k ) (θ) . (5)
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From (4) it is clear that given θ∗, there exists a uniquely determined θn (θ
∗), and from
the discussion above, there exist unique γ∗ (θ∗) , γs (θ
∗) , γn (θ
∗) . Showing existence and
uniqueness of a switching strategy equilibrium is equivalent to showing that
Φ
(√
τ (θ∗ − µ)√
1 + τ
− Φ
−1 ( θ∗
k
)
√
1 + τ
)
=
k
n+Q (θ∗)
(6)
has a unique solution. In the Appendix we prove that this is the case if the difference
between s and n is not too large, when τ is sufficiently small.
To establish existence of dominance regions, note that for very low first period signals
joining is always a strictly dominant strategy. If the signal is sufficiently high, meaning
that there is very small probability of getting the good, even if everybody else joins, stay
out is dominant if the payoff difference between seniors and new members is not too
high: s − n < k. Since pi (θi, θn) is decreasing in the first argument and increasing in
the second, the same reasoning in Theorem 1 establishes that the equilibrium in cutoff
strategy that we found is the unique equilibrium of this game.
A direct inspection of (6) shows that, since Q (θ∗) > 0 and the LHS is decreasing in
θ∗ when τ is small, seniority benefits increase membership also in the first period.
6 Conclusion
Our model analyzes a membership game in which agents decide to join a group that
provides a public good and selective incentives. When selective benefits are excludable,
non-rival, and tied to the provision of public good a unique equilibrium exists. Our equi-
librium analysis yields comparative statics predictions that are consistent with the main
findings of the political science literature on large citizen associations. In the heteroge-
neous agent case we show in what sense heterogeneity can be detrimental when perfect
screening is not feasible. We further analyze a dynamic version of the model, where
heterogeneity emerges endogenously. This is one of the few examples to our knowledge
of a dynamic version of global games with payoff complementarities between different
periods. A unique equilibrium that exhibits persistence in membership exists, given re-
strictions on admissible continuation payoffs. This suggests that a multiple period version
16
of the model will require even more stringent conditions and eventually might leave open
the possibility of non uniquely determined equilibrium beliefs, leading back to multiple
equilibria.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let Φx|y be the cumulative normal distribution of x given y with corresponding density
φx|y. Using well-known properties of the normal distribution we have that:
θj|θ ∼ N (θ, τ)
θ|θi ∼ N
(
µτ + σθi
σ + τ
,
τσ
σ + τ
)
.
Conditional on the true state θ, if everybody follows a switching strategy around θn, the
proportion of agents joining is:
Φθj |θ (θn) = Φ
(
θn − θ√
τ
)
.
The critical value θ∗ below which the group is successful is implicitly defined by:
kΦ
(
θn − θ∗√
τ
)
= θ∗.
Note that for any θn, there exists a unique θ
∗that solves the above equation, and θ∗ ∈
(0, k). Conditional on θi, the expected payoff of an agent is:
Pr (θ ≤ θ∗|θi)n− k = Φ
(
σ (θ∗ − θi) + τ (θ∗ − µ)√
τσ (σ + τ)
)
n− k.
When θi = θn the agent should be indifferent between joining or not. Therefore we obtain
a system of two equation in two unknowns:
Φ
(
θn−θ∗√
τ
)
= θ
∗
k
Φ
(
σ(θ∗−θn)+τ(θ∗−µ)√
τσ(σ+τ)
)
= k
n
,
that is equivalent to: 
θn = θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
)
Φ
(√
τ(θ∗−µ)√
σ(σ+τ)
−
√
σΦ−1( θ
∗
k )√
σ+τ
)
= k
n
.
Let
W (θ∗) ≡
√
τ (θ∗ − µ)√
σ (σ + τ)
−
√
σΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
)
√
σ + τ
− Φ−1
(
k
n
)
,
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and note that:
lim
θ∗→0
W (θ∗) =∞
lim
θ∗→k
W (θ∗) = −∞
dW
dθ∗
=
1√
σ + τ
(√
τ√
σ
−
√
σ
kφ
(
Φ−1
(
θ∗
k
))) <
<
1√
σ + τ
(√
τ√
σ
−
√
2piσ
k
)
.
Since the last expression is negative when:
√
τ <
σ
√
2pi
k
,
the solution is unique for small τ .
In the limit:
lim
τ→0
θn = lim
τ→0
θ∗ = k
(
1− k
n
)
.
The last step of the argument is to show that the above equilibrium in switching
strategies is indeed the only one surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated strate-
gies. This part of the proof follows closely the argument in Morris and Shin [13]. Define:
pi (θi, θn) = Φθ|θi [kΦθj |θ(θn)]n− k
pi (θi, θn) is the expected utility of membership conditional on θi when everybody else
follows a switching strategy around θn. If θi < θ join is a strictly dominant action so
after the first stage of iterated deletion θ1n ≥ θ. Now θn2 is defined as the solution to:
pi
(
θ2n, θ
1
n
)
= 0.
Note that by strategic complementarities joining below θ2n strictly dominates any other
strategy that prescribes joining below θ1n. By further iteration we can construct a se-
quence
{
θkn
}k=+∞
k=1
that is increasing since pi (·, ·) is decreasing in its first argument and
increasing in the second. The smallest solution θ∗ to pi (θ, θ) = 0 is the limit of the
sequence. The same argument can be done starting from θ to get a decreasing sequence
with limit θ
∗
that is the largest solution to pi (θ, θ) = 0. But since we proved above that
there is a unique solution θ∗ to pi (θ, θ) = 0 then θ∗ = θ
∗
= θ∗.
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Proof of Theorem 2.
Let θ∗ be the critical value below which the group is successful and θn, θs be the
cutoffs. In equilibrium the following system has to be satisfied:
pΦ
(
θn−θ∗√
τ
)
+ (1− p) Φ
(
θs−θ∗√
τ
)
= θ
∗
k
Φ
(
θ∗−θn+τ(θ∗−µ)√
τ(1+τ)
)
= k
n
Φ
(
θ∗−θs+τ(θ∗−µ)√
τ(1+τ)
)
= k
s
,
which is equivalent to:
pΦ
(√
τ (θ∗ − µ)−√1 + τΦ−1 ( k
n
))
+
+(1− p) Φ (√τ (θ∗ − µ)−√1 + τΦ−1 (k
s
))
= θ
∗
k
(θn−θ∗)√
τ
=
√
τ (θ∗ − µ)−√1 + τΦ−1 ( k
n
)
(θs−θ∗)√
τ
=
√
τ (θ∗ − µ)−√1 + τΦ−1 (k
s
)
.
Let
T (θ∗) ≡ pΦ
(√
τ (θ∗ − µ)−√1 + τΦ−1
(
k
n
))
+
+(1− p) Φ
(√
τ (θ∗ − µ)−√1 + τΦ−1
(
k
s
))
− θ
∗
k
,
and note that:
lim
θ∗→0
T (θ∗) > 0
lim
θ∗→k
T (θ∗) < 0
dT
dθ∗
≤
√
τ
2pi
− 1
k
.
Since the last expression is negative when
√
τ <
√
2pi
k
,
the solution is unique for small τ .
To show the uniqueness of equilibrium define:
pin (θi, θn, θs) = Φθ|θi
{
k
[
pΦθj |θ(θn) + (1− p) Φθj |θ(θs)
]}
n− k
pis (θi, θn, θs) = Φθ|θi
{
k
[
pΦθj |θ(θn) + (1− p) Φθj |θ(θs)
]}
s− k
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as the expected utility of membership conditional on θi when everybody else follows a
switching strategy around θn and θs.
Note that there exist θ¯n, and θ¯s such that: pin (θi, θn, θs) ≤ Φθ|θi (k)n− k < 0 if θi > θ¯npis (θi, θn, θs) ≤ Φθ|θi (k) s− k < 0 if θi > θ¯s.
This means that if θi > θ¯n stay out is a strictly dominant action for n types and,
after the first stage of iterated deletion, θ1n ≤ θ¯n. Similarly we obtain θ1s ≤ θ¯s. Now θ2n,
θ2s are defined as the solution to:
pin
(
θ2n, θ
1
n, θ
1
s
)
= 0
pis
(
θ2s, θ
1
n, θ
1
s
)
= 0.
By further iteration we end up with a two dimensional sequence
{
θkn, θ
k
s
}
that is decreas-
ing since pin (·, ·, ·) and pis (·, ·, ·) are decreasing in their first argument and increasing in
the second and the third. The largest solution
{
θn, θs
}
to the system
pin (θn, θn, θs) = 0
pis (θs, θn, θs) = 0
is the limit of the sequence. The same argument can be done starting from above to
get a decreasing sequence with limit
{
θ
n
, θ
s
}
that is the smallest solution to the above
system. But since we proved that there is a unique solution to the system we are done.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The expected size of the group is:
S = pΦ
(
θn − µ√
1 + τ
)
+ (1− p) Φ
(
θs − µ√
1 + τ
)
.
Taking derivatives we get:
∆S =
1√
1 + τ
(
pφ
(
θn − µ√
1 + τ
)
∆θn + (1− p)φ
(
θs − µ√
1 + τ
)
∆θs
)
.
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Applying the implicit function theorem we obtain expressions for ∆θn and ∆θs. When
τ goes to 0 we get:
lim
τ→0
∆θs = lim
τ→0
∆θn = −
(
k
ns
)2
(1− p) (s2 − n2) < 0
lim
τ→0
θs = lim
τ→0
θn = lim
τ→0
θ∗ = k
(
1− k
ns
(ps+ (1− p)n)
)
.
Hence,
lim
τ→0
∆S = −
(
k
ns
)2
(1− p) (s2 − n2)φ(k(1− k
ns
(ps+ (1− p)n)
)
− µ
)
,
and when s = n, limτ→0∆S = 0, otherwise limτ→0∆S < 0.
Proof of Claim 1.
We want to show that
∫ +∞
−∞
(∫ γs
−∞
gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)−
∫ γn
−∞
gn (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)
)
dΦθ|θi (θ)
is decreasing in θi.
From the exogenous heterogeneity case we know that:
gn (γn, θ, θn) = gs (γs, θ, θn) = 0. (7)
gn (γi, θ, θn) = Φγ|γi
{
k
[
Φθj |θ (θn) Φγj |γ (γs) +
(
1− Φθj |θ (θn)
)
Φγj |γ (γn)
]}
n− k
gs (γi, θ, θn) = Φγ|γi
{
k
[
Φθj |θ (θn) Φγj |γ (γs) +
(
1− Φθj |θ (θn)
)
Φγj |γ (γn)
]}
s− k
Note also that:
gs (γi, θ, θn) = gn (γi, θ, θn)
s
n
+ k
s− n
n
for γi ≤ γn,
and, using results derived above:
dγs
dp
=
dγn
dp
=
1√
τ
(
Φ
(
γs−γ∗√
τ
)
− Φ
(
γn−γ∗√
τ
))
1
(1+τ)
(
pφ
(
γn−γ∗√
τ
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
γs−γ∗√
τ
)
− 1
k
1√
τ
) < 0, (8)
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since γs > γn, and the denominator is negative for small τ . This implies also that: ddθgn (γi, θ, θn) < 0d
dθ
gs (γi, θ, θn) < 0.
(9)
An increase in θ, increases the proportion p = 1 − Φθj |θ (θn) of non-joiners in the first
period. Keeping γs and γn fixed, this reduces gn and gs, since γs > γn. Moreover, gn
and gs are monotonically increasing in γs and γn.
Combining the previous results we obtain:
d
dθi

∫ +∞
−∞
∫ γs
−∞ gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi) dΦθ|θi (θ)+
− ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ γn−∞ gn (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi) dΦθ|θi (θ)
 =
=
∫ +∞
−∞
[∫ γn
−∞
[gn (γi, θ, θn) + k]
s− n
n
dΦγi (γi) +
∫ γs
γn
gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)
]
dφθ|θi (θ)
dθi
dθ =
=
∫ +∞
−∞
J (θ)H (θ) dθ,
where
J (θ) =
∫ γn
−∞
[gn (γi, θ, θn) + k]
s− n
n
dΦγi (γi) +
∫ γs
γn
gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)
H (θ) =
dφ
(
θ−θi+τ(θ−µ)√
τ(1+τ)
)
dθi
=
θ − θi + τ (θ − µ)
τ (1 + τ)
φ
(
θ − θi + τ (θ − µ)√
τ (1 + τ)
)
.
Note that J (θ) is decreasing in θ, which can be shown using (8) and (9), and that H (θ)
is quasi-monotone in θ and ∫ +∞
−∞
H (θ) dθ = 0.
Hence: ∫ +∞
−∞
H (θ) J (θ) dθ =
∫ +∞
−∞
H (θ)
[
J (θ)− J
(
τµ+ θi
1 + τ
)]
dθ =
=

∫ τµ+θi
1+τ
−∞ H (θ)
[
J (θ)− J ( τµ+θi
1+τ
)]
dθ+∫ +∞
τµ+θi
1+τ
H (θ)
[
J (θ)− J ( τµ+θi
1+τ
)]
dθ
 < 0,
which implies that∫ +∞
−∞
(∫ γs
−∞
gs (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)−
∫ γn
−∞
gn (γi, θ, θn) dΦγi (γi)
)
dΦθ|θi (θ)
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is decreasing in θi.
Proof of existence and uniqueness of a solution to
Φ
(√
τ (θ∗ − µ)√
1 + τ
− Φ
−1 ( θ∗
k
)
√
1 + τ
)
=
k
n+Q (θ∗)
(6)
Recalling the definition of Q (θ∗) in (5), we know that Q (θ∗) ∈ [0, s − n]. In (6), if
θ∗ → 0, the LHS converges to 1, while the RHS is smaller than k
n
< 1. When θ∗ → k,
the LHS converges to 0, while the RHS is larger than k
s
> 0. Since LHS and RHS
are continuous functions of θ∗, a solution exists. To show uniqueness, the additional
complication with respect to the proof of Theorem 1 is to show the behavior of dQ(θ
∗)
dθ∗
when τ is small. Using (5),
dQ (θ∗)
dθ∗
=
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ γs
−∞ gs
(
γi, θ, θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
))
dΦγi (γi) dφθ|θi=θ∗+
√
τΦ−1( θ∗k )
(θ)+
+
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ γs
−∞
d(gs(γi,θ,θ∗+
√
τΦ−1( θ
∗
k )))
dθ∗ dΦγi (γi) dΦθ|θi=θ∗+
√
τΦ−1( θ∗k )
(θ)+
− ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ γn−∞ d(gn(γi,θ,θ∗+√τΦ−1( θ∗k )))dθ∗ dΦγi (γi) dΦθ|θi=θ∗+√τΦ−1( θ∗k ) (θ)+
− ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ γn−∞ gn (γi, θ, θ∗ +√τΦ−1 ( θ∗k )) dΦγi (γi) dφθ|θi=θ∗+√τΦ−1( θ∗k ) (θ) .

We denote
~θ
∗
n = lim
τ→0
θ∗n
~θ
∗
= lim
τ→0
θ∗
~γ∗ = lim
τ→0
γ∗,
and when τ → 0, we have
gn (γi, θ, θn) → Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
n− k
gs (γi, θ, θn) → Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
s− k
p = 1− Φθj |θ
(
~θ
∗
n
)
,
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Using the definition of gs and gn, calculating their derivative with respect to θ
∗ and taking
limits we obtain:
lim
τ→0
d
(
gs
(
γi, θ, θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
)))
dθ∗
= φγ|γi
(
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
)
φγj |γ (~γ
∗)
k3 (s− n)
n
φθj |θ
(
~θ
∗)
> 0
lim
τ→0
d
(
gn
(
γi, θ, θ
∗ +
√
τΦ−1
(
θ∗
k
)))
dθ∗
= φγ|γi
(
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
)
φγj |γ (~γ
∗)
k3 (s− n)
s
φθj |θ
(
~θ
∗)
> 0
lim
τ→0
dγs
dp
= lim
τ→0
dγn
dp
= lim
τ→0
dγ∗
dp
= −k
(
k
s− n
ns
)
< 0,
and dQ(θ
∗)
dθ∗ converges to
(s− n) ∫ +∞−∞ ∫ ~γ∗−∞Φγ|γi {kΦγj |γ (~γ∗)} dΦγi (γi) dφθ|θi=~θn (θ)+
+k
3(s−n)2
ns
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ ~γ∗
−∞ φγ|γi
(
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
)
φγj |γ (~γ
∗)φθj |θ
(
~θ
∗)
dΦγi (γi) dΦθ|θi=~θn (θ) > 0,
(10)
when τ is going to zero. Note that the first integral in (10) is positive and smaller than
s−n√
2pi
. Indeed,
(s− n)
∫ +∞
−∞
[∫ ~γ∗
−∞
Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
dΦγi (γi)
]
dφθ|θi=~θn (θ) =
− (s− n)
∫ +∞
−∞
[∫ ~γ∗
−∞
Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
dΦγi (γi)
]
xφ (x) dx,
where
x =
(θ − θ∗) + τ (θ − µ)−√τΦ−1 ( θ∗
k
)√
τ (1 + τ)
.
Since ∫ ~γ∗
−∞
Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
dΦγi (γi)
is positive, smaller than 1, and decreasing in x, and since∫ +∞
−∞
xφ (x) dx = 0
then
(s− n)
∫ +∞
−∞
[∫ ~γ∗
−∞
Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
dΦγi (γi)
]
dφθ|θi=~θn (θ) > 0.
Moreover, note that
(s− n)
∫ +∞
−∞
[∫ ~γ∗
−∞
Φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (~γ
∗)
}
dΦγi (γi)
]
dφθ|θi=~θn (θ) <
< (s− n)
∫ +∞
0
xφ (x) dx =
s− n√
2pi
.
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We can bound the second integral in (10) as follows:
k3 (s− n)2
ns
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ γ∗
−∞
φγ|γi
{
kΦγj |γ (γ
∗)
}
φγj |γ (γ
∗) dΦγi (γi) dΦθ|θi=~θn (θ)
<
k3 (s− n)2
ns
1
2pi
.
Since the derivative of the LHS of (6) converges to − 1
k
when τ → 0, a sufficient condition
for uniqueness is
1
k
> lim
τ→0
(
k
(n+Q (θ∗))2
dQ (θ∗)
dθ∗
)
. (11)
Note that
lim
τ→0
dQ (θ∗)
dθ∗
≤ s− n√
2pi
(
k3 (s− n)
ns
1√
2pi
+ 1
)
, (12)
and that the RHS of (12) is an increasing function of s− n, in the relevant range where
s − n > 0. Hence there exists a b > 0 such that, if (s− n) < b, (11) is satisfied. This
shows existence and uniqueness of a solution to pi (θ∗, θ∗) = 0.
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